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Intention recognition is an important characteristic of intelligent agents. In their interac-
tions with others, they try to read others’ intentions and make an image of others to choose
their actions accordingly. While the way in which players choose their actions depending on
such intentions has been investigated in game theory, how dynamic changes in intentions by
mutually reading others’ intentions are incorporated into game theory has not been explored.
We present a novel formulation of game theory in which players read others’ intentions
and change their own through an iterated game. Here, intention is given as a function of the
other’s action and the own action to be taken accordingly as the dependent variable, while
the mutual recognition of intention is represented as the functional dynamics.
It is shown that a player suffers no disadvantage when he/she recognizes the other’s inten-
tion, whereas the functional dynamics reach equilibria in which both players’ intentions are
optimized. These cover a classical Nash and Stackelberg equilibria but we extend them in
this study: Novel equilibria exist depending on the degree of mutual recognition. Moreover,
the degree to which each player recognizes the other can also differ. This formulation is
applied to resource competition, duopoly, and prisoner’s dilemma games. For example, in
the resource competition game with player-dependent capacity on gaining the resource, the
superior player’s recognition leads to the exploitation of the other, while the inferior player’s
recognition leads to cooperation through which both players’ payoffs increase.
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I. INTRODUCTION
How each individual decides his/her own behavior is a long-standing problem in nature. Each
agent freely behaves and receives a reward as a result. This situation is generally formulated as
a “normal form game” in which the “player,” “action,” and “payoff” are given [1]. In a standard
game played only once, each player needs to decide what action he/she chooses as his/her own
strategy. An optimal strategy is to choose the best rewarded action depending on others’ actions,
which results in the Nash equilibrium [2, 3]. However, while this is the optimal strategy in a
one-shot game, it is common that the game is repeatedly played in reality. In a repeated game,
each player can refer to a data set on the history of actions played in the past and use this for the
next game or a later one. The Nash equilibrium was not originally introduced to deal with such a
situation. Instead, one possible equilibrium is given by the “folk theorem” [4–6], where deviation
from the Nash equilibrium can happen; however, the theorem only provides the requirements for
the achieved equilibrium and cannot specify which equilibrium is really achieved. To determine
an optimal strategy, which is now nothing given as in a one-shot game, we must therefore adopt
a concrete learning process through which each player improves his/her own strategy against that
of the other player.
An important characteristic of an intelligent agent (i.e., a human) is to recognize and make
an image of others by using the history of the other’s actions. Such an agent assumes that the
other intentionally changes the next action in response to the agent’s own action. For example, a
descriptive and predictive model for a person’s cognitive behavior has been proposed [7, 8], as is
based on the experiments of a repeated beauty contest game [9, 10]. In this model, each person
is given a cognitive level. The level 0 person chooses an action with no recognition (randomly),
while the level k(> 0) person best responds to the image of others at the (k− 1)th level (or lower).
Recently, such cognitive levels have been uncovered in neural economics [11]. As another example,
it has been reported that information on others’ true intentions increases the performance in the
game when the actions of others are transferred with disturbances by noise [12–15]. Following
this experimental result, the evolution of the ability to recognize others’ intentions is theoretically
discussed [16–18]. Although the above studies sufficiently justify the existence of humans’ ability
to recognize others and benefit from that, a theory for the dynamic coevolution of images between
3agents has been underdeveloped. In [19], how a player builds and deconstructs the other’s image
in prisoner’s dilemma games has been studied by using a recurrent network. How the equilibrium
of actions is shaped and how it deviates from the Nash equilibrium, however, are not analyzed.
Here, we develop a theoretical framework with mutual learning that shapes the other’s internal
intentions, generally applicable to any games, without resorting to specific learning algorithms.
Once every agent has an image of the other and best responds to it, the sequential actions are
given. Therefore, how an agent constructs the other’s image itself is now a strategy in repeated
games, which is represented as a function, as shown later. Initially, both agents best respond
to each other without referring to the other’s strategy. Hence, both best-response functions as
strategies achieve nothing but the Nash equilibrium [2, 3]. Then, before considering the dynamics
of a pair of such strategy functions, we see an extreme case that an agent one-sidedly reads the
other’s strategy function. In this case, the Stackelberg equilibrium [20] is achieved, which is defined
as an equilibrium in an “extensive form game” [21] under perfect information.
Following these introductory results, we study the dynamics of strategy functions, which rep-
resent that agents mutually recognize the other’s intention. With repeated games, each agent
accurately reads the other’s strategy function and optimizes his/her own one based on it. This
dynamics reaches an equilibrium when there is no additional advantage for the further recognition
of the other’s strategy. At this point, a “functional equilibrium” is achieved between both players’
strategies instead of the original Nash equilibrium.
Note that our formulation can be applied to general games. Here, applications to resource
competition, duopoly, and probabilistic prisoner’s dilemma games are provided as examples. In
the former case, it is found that learning by an inferior agent increases the payoffs of both players,
while that by a superior agent enhances exploitation and decreases the payoff of the other.
II. NASH EQUILIBRIUM
We consider a two-player game in which players are denoted by i ∈ {1, 2}. In addition, each
player i’s action and its payoff are represented by xi and ui(x1, x2), respectively, which are contin-
uous variables. A player tries to receive a higher payoff by optimizing his/her action depending on
the other’s action. Now, each player has an intention on which action he/she chooses depending on
the other’s action. The intentions vary depending on how the player imagines the other’s action.
Thus, the intention of player 1 is given as strategy function f1(x2), which represents that action
x1 is chosen when player 2 takes action x2. Player 2’s strategy function is similarly defined as
4f2(x1). Then, assuming that each player’s action follows his/her own strategy, the equilibrium set
of actions, denoted by (xeq1 , x
eq
2 ), is given by the crossing point of both players’ functions. In other
words, we get
xeq1 = f1(x
eq
2 ),
xeq2 = f2(x
eq
1 ).
(1)
In this section, we consider a situation in which both players have no recognition of the other’s
intention. In this case, each player simply maximizes his/her own payoff without referring to the
other’s strategy. To be consistent with the standard terminology, this strategy is called the “best-
response” [3], as denoted by fB1 (x2) (B-response) for player 1. According to this definition, f
B
1 (x2)
satisfies
fB1 (x2) := argmaxx1u1(x1, x2). (2)
Eq. 2 simply means that player 1’s strategy function is given by maximizing the payoff under
the assumption that the other’s action is constant independent of his/her own action. At this
point, note that the strategy function given by B-response depends on the other’s action x2.
Player 2’s B-response is given in the same way. Thus, when both players make B-responses,
the equilibrium, denoted by (xBB1 , x
BB
2 ), is nothing but the Nash equilibrium from its definition.
In the present paper, however, we call it the BB equilibrium, where the left index indicates the
player’s strategy to the other’s strategy given by the right index, because the same equilibrium
set of actions can be achieved by different sets of functions. In this study, which pair of functions
results in the equilibrium action is important; hence, we need to specify not only the equilibrium
point but the pair of functions to achieve it. At the BB equilibrium, each player’s payoff is defined
as uBBi := ui(x
BB
1 , x
BB
2 ).
III. DEFINITION OF THE LEARNING RESPONSE AND ONE-SIDED RECOGNITION
Next, we define another type of intention where a player perfectly recognizes the other’s inten-
tion. Then, each player optimizes his/her action based on the information on the other’s strategy
function. This strategy is termed the “learning response” (L-response), denoted by fL1 (x2), which
is the response to the function of f2(x1). Hence, it follows that
fL1 (x2) := argmaxx1u1(x1, f2(x1)). (3)
An obvious difference between the L- and B-responses lies in the form of the recognized player’s
action. Recall that in the B-response, 1’s strategy is given under the image that the other’s action
5is independent of his/her own action (see Eq. 2). On the contrary, in the L-response, 1’s strategy is
given by the learning that the other’s action depends on his/her own action (see Eq. 34). Therefore,
the L-response is independent of x2, while the B-response depends on x2.
We now consider a situation in which player 1 one-sidedly recognizes 2’s intention. In this case,
player 1 (2) makes the L- (B-) response. The crossing of these functions is defined as the LB
equilibrium (xLB1 , x
LB
2 ), which is given by
xLB1 = f
L
1 (x
LB
2 ),
xLB2 = f
B
2 (x
LB
1 ).
(4)
Then, player i’s payoff is defined as uLBi := ui(x
LB
1 , x
LB
2 ). In the same way, the BL equilibrium
is defined as the crossing point between the B-response of player 1 and the L-response of player 2.
In the duopoly game to be discussed later, the LB (BL) equilibrium is known as the “Stackelberg
equilibrium” [20], while in general games, it belongs to “sub-game perfect equilibria” [22, 23]. Here,
we use the term the Stackelberg equilibrium in any games. Therefore, one-sided recognition means
a transition from the Nash equilibrium to the Stackelberg equilibrium.
We now study some of the general properties of such one-sided recognition. First, a player does
not lose any benefit by learning the other’s B-response; in other words, uLB1 ≥ uBB2 holds. This is
easily proven as
uLB1 = maxx1u1(x1, f
B
2 (x1))
≥ u1(xBB1 , fB2 (xBB1 ))
= uBB1 .
(5)
This inequality is understood as follows: as the player adopting B-response chooses the strategy
depending on the other, the other player can take advantage of the other’s strategy and shift
the equilibrium point (i.e., xLB1 or x
BL
2 ) one-sidedly, in order to get more payoff. (Note that the
Zero Determinant strategy by Press and Dyson [24] in prisoner’s dilemma game, adopts a similar
strategy, as the optimization strategy of one player itself is taken advantage by the other to increase
the payoff.
Second, we obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for a recognizing player to increase his/her
payoff. When player 1 makes the L-response, 1 refers to 2’s strategy. In other words, how 2’s action
changes depends on 1’s action. Thus, 1’s action deviates from the BB equilibrium if 2’s strategy
function has a nonzero gradient around the BB equilibrium. Considering the case when the LB and
BB equilibria are achieved within the interior of the possible range of players’ actions [xmin, xmax
6(i.e., at xmin < x < xmax), the condition for it is given by
∂u1
∂x2
∣∣∣∣
BB
6= 0,
∂2u2
∂x1∂x2
∣∣∣∣
BB
6= 0.
(6)
The condition for player 2’s L-response is obtained in the same way. (See the Supplementary Data
for the detailed calculation.)
In example 1, Eq. 6 is satisfied as long as the abilities of the two players are not equal, as
discussed below. In addition, in example 2, Eq. 6 always holds (see the Supplementary Data). By
contrast, in example 3, the prisoner’s dilemma game, both LB and BB lie on the boundary of the
range of actions [xmin, xmax] players can take. In this example, x
BB
i = x
LB
i = x
BL
i holds (see the
Supplementary Data). Then, the learning discussed below cannot change the action nor strategy
function. Hence, we no longer discuss this example.
The above result is interpreted by the relationship between both players’ strategies. For the
fixed 2’s strategy f2(x1), 1’s strategy f1(x2) enables him/herself to realize benefit u
eq
1 . Therefore,
the condition that 1’s strategy is optimal and is not changed by the other’s strategy is given by
ueq1 = maxx1u1(x1, f2(x1)). (7)
If the same equation for player 2 holds, the set of strategy functions is in the equilibrium. We
define this as the “function equilibrium.”
As illustrated in the following two examples, the function equilibrium is not satisfied at the BB
equilibrium in general because the function of the other player imagined by one player does not
agree with the real function of the other. In the B-response, the player imagines that the other’s
strategy function is constant, and he/she chooses his/her strategy accordingly. When both players
make B-responses, however, the function of each player is no longer constant in contrast to the
assumption for the B-response. Therefore, both players still gain an advantage by learning the
other’s strategy function.
On the contrary, there is no such disagreement at the LB or BL equilibria, where the L-response
player imagines that the other’s action can be changeable depending on the learning side’s action,
and as a result, the real strategy function is made to be constant. Thus, the real and imagined
straetgy functions are consistent with each other. Then, there are no more advantages of learning
the other’s strategy for both players, and the function equilibrium is satisfied.
Next, we consider whether the learned side increases or decreases his/her payoff. Let us consider
the “competitive” case in which an increase in xi leads to disutility for the other as is given by
7∂u1/∂x2, ∂u2/∂x1 < 0. Indeed, a few nontrivial games satisfy such a relation, as discussed in these
two examples. In this case, if player 1 is more competitive owing to recognition (xLB1 > x
BB
1 ), the
following relationship is satisfied:
uLB2 = u2(x
LB
1 , x
LB
2 )
< u2(x
BB
1 , x
LB
2 )
≤ maxx2u2(xBB1 , x2)
= uBB2 .
(8)
Then, the learned player is proven to receive a payoff below the BB equilibrium.
On the contrary, if player 1 is less competitive (xLB1 > x
BB
2 ), we get u
BB
2 < u
LB
2 in the
same way. In addition, we can deal with another case, for example, a cooperative situation
∂u1/∂x2, ∂u2/∂x1 > 0 by inverting each player’s action x1 → −x1, x2 → −x2. For example,
the public goods game [25] belongs to this type.
Here, in contrast to earlier studies, we consider not only the equilibrium set of actions but
also the functions of the players to achieve it,based on the recognition of the other’s intention.
Accordingly, the function equilibrium that deviates from the Nash equilibrium is introduced. We
explicitly calculate the BB, LB, and BL equilibria in specific examples.
A. Example 1: resource competition game
As an example of the BL and LB responses formulated above, we consider a “resource compe-
tition” game. In this game, both players i ∈ {1, 2} pay cost xi ≥ 0 to compete for a restricted
resource with the total amount of unit one. Each player’s reward, defined as the distributed re-
source, is proportional to the paid cost. Here, the efficiency to get resource per cost is given by ri.
Each player’s payoff ui is defined as the difference between the reward and cost, so that
u1(x1, x2) :=
r1x1
r1x1 + r2x2
− x1,
u2(x1, x2) :=
r2x2
r1x1 + r2x2
− x2.
(9)
We assume that the abilities of the players differ, meaning that r1 ≥ r2. Without loss of generality,
r2 is set at 1, and we take r1 ≡ r ≤ 1. When r = 1, the abilities of the two players are identical,
while r > 1 means that player 1 is superior to 2. This game is a continuous version of the hawk dove
game [26, 27]. In addition, this continuous game was recently applied to hierarchical competition
[28].
8FIG. 1. The BB (left), LB (center), and BL (right) equilibria in the case of r = 1.5 in a resource competition
game. For all three figures, the X-axis (Y-axis) indicates player 1’s (2’s) action, denoted by x1 (x2). The
blue (green) line indicates 1’s (2’s) intention f1(x2) (f2(x1)) at the equilibrium. The cyan (magenta) dots
indicate the Nash (Stackelberg) equilibria, respectively.
In this resource competition game, each player’s B-response is given (see Fig. 1-A) by
fB1 (x2) = max(
√
x2/r − x2/r, 0),
fB2 (x1) = max(
√
rx1 − rx1, 0).
(10)
From Eq. 1, we get the set of actions at the BB (Nash) equilibrium as the crossing of the strategy
functions.
Next, we consider the case in which only player 1 learns 2’s B-response. Player 1’s L-response
is given (see Fig. 1-B) by
fL1 (x2) =

 r/4 (1 ≤ r < 2)1/r (2 ≤ r) (11)
Then, the LB equilibrium is different from the BB equilibrium (compare Fig. 1-B with A).
We now study how these two are different (see the Supplementary Data for the detailed calcu-
lation). From Fig. 1, we get xLB1 > x
BB
1 , x
LB
2 < x
BB
2 , u
LB
1 > u
BB
1 , and u
LB
2 < u
BB
2 . These equations
indicate that owing to the superior player’s one-way learning, he/she increases his/her cost but
increases his/her payoff, while the other player decreases his/her payoff while decreasing his/her
cost.
On the contrary, when player 2 one-sidedly learns 1’s B-response, 2’s L-response is given (see
Fig. 1-C) by
fL2 (x1) = 1/(4r). (12)
In this case, we get xBL1 < x
BB
1 , x
BL
2 < x
BB
2 , and u
BL
1 > u
BB
1 , u
BL
2 > u
BB
2 as shown in Fig. 1 (see
the Supplementary Data for the detailed calculation). Hence, both the players decrease their costs
9and increase their payoffs owing to the one-way learning of the inferior player in contrast to that
of the superior player.
The LB and BL equilibria correspond to the classical Stackelberg ones [20, 22, 23]. In particular,
LB indicates an equilibrium for a situation that 1 firstly determines his/her action and 2 follows it
given the information on 1’s action. BL indicates the converse situation. Note again that we focus
not only on the crossing equilibrium but also on which pair of strategy functions is achieved in the
equilibrium. Thus, we here call the Stackelberg equilibrium the LB or BL equilibrium in the same
way that we call the Nash equilibrium the BB equilibrium.
The superior player’s one-way learning results in exploitation by gaining more benefit by in-
creasing its own cost, while the inferior player’s learning results in cooperation by decreasing its
own cost. This is interpreted as follows. First, the cost a player should pay depends on the other’s
cost. A player would not need to pay so much when the other’s cost is too small because the player
would monopolize most resources by paying not so much cost. On the contrary, if the other’s cost
is too large, the player would not pay much cost either because one should pay too much cost
to obtain more resources. Therefore, a player’s optimal cost is maximal when the other pays a
moderate cost (see Fig. 1-A). Second, in the BB equilibrium, both players pay a moderate cost.
Hence, no matter whether the learning player is superior or not, the player has to repress the
other’s cost to gain more benefits. How to repress the other’s cost, however, depends on whether
the player is superior or not. The superior player increases his/her cost and forces the inferior one
to give up competition. Therefore, the former exploits the latter by learning the other’s strategy.
On the contrary, to gain a higher payoff, the inferior player decreases his/her cost and relaxes the
competition. Therefore, the learning player cooperates with the learned one.
How the learning and learned players’ payoffs change depends on the type of game. Below, we
discuss an alternative example, namely a duopoly game, in which competition always persists to
the point that an increase in the payoff of the learning player always decreases the other’s payoff.
B. Example 2: duopoly game
In a duopoly game, two companies i ∈ {1, 2}, which separately supply products, compete for a
limited market. The more products supplied in this limited market, the cheaper their prices are.
Here, player i’s action xi is the number of products he/she supplies. We assume that the price is
max(0, p−x1−x2), where p represents the maximal price. In addition, player i’s cost of supplying
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products is assumed to be ci. Thus, player i’s payoff is given by
u1(x1, x2) := x1(max(0, p − x1 − x2)− c1),
u2(x1, x2) := x2(max(0, p − x1 − x2)− c2).
(13)
Here, we assume c1 ≤ c2 without loss of generality. In other words, player 1 is superior to 2.
The strategy functions in the BB, LB, and BL equilibria are plotted in Figs. 2-A, B, and
C, respectively. Accordingly, from the crossing points, we obtain uLB1 > u
BB
1 and u
LB
2 < u
BB
2 .
These equations indicate that the superior company’s learning results in the exploitation of the
learned one, as in the resource competition game. On the contrary, we get uBL1 < u
BB
1 and
uBL2 > u
BB
2 . In contrast to the resource competition game, the inferior company’s learning also
results in exploitation. (See the Supplementary Data for the detailed calculation.)
FIG. 2. The BB (left), LB (center), and BL (right) equilibria in the case of (c1, c2) = (0, 0.2) in a resource
competition game. For all three figures, the X-axis (Y-axis) indicates player 1’s (2’s) action, denoted by x1
(x2). The blue (green) line indicates 1’s (2’s) strategy function f1(x2) (f2(x1)) at the equilibrium. The cyan
(magenta) dots indicate the Nash (Stackelberg) equilibria.
Although both the resource competition and the duopoly games are categorized as competitive
(∂u1/∂x2, ∂u2/∂x1 < 0), the change in the learned player’s payoff differs between the two. As
has already been explained, this difference depends on whether the learning side is more or less
competitive according to one-way learning (see Eq. 8). Each player’s motivation to change his/her
competitiveness is now discussed based on the following dynamic process of learning.
IV. FUNCTIONAL DYNAMICS OF STRATEGIES
So far, we first considered the BB equilibrium in which both players have no recognition of the
other’s intention. Then, we introduced the LB and BL equilibria in which a player one-sidedly
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recognizes the intention of the other. When one recognizes the other but not vice versa, the
recognizing player has an advantage. However, such one-way recognition rarely appears because
both of the players usually try to recognize each other’s intention. Another problem in the L-
response is that one player knows the other’s intention perfectly in a one-shot game, while players
usually shape the image of the other successively through the iteration of games. If both players
recognize the other’s intention gradually, the LB or BL (Stackelberg) equilibrium is no longer
achieved. Instead, a set of actions that are not discussed by previous studies can be achieved, as
shown below.
To represent such a gradual recognizing process, we assume that each player i learns the other’s
strategy at a rate of ǫi. In this case, each player’s strategy function f1(x2) and f2(x1) changes
depending on the other’s one as
f1(x2)[t+ 1] = argmaxx1u1(x1, ǫ1f2(x1)[t] + (1− ǫ1)x2),
f2(x1)[t+ 1] = argmaxx2u2(ǫ2f1(x2)[t] + (1− ǫ2)x1, x2).
(14)
For ǫ1 = 0, f1 in the one-shot game corresponds to the B-response (see Eq. 2); for ǫ1 = 1,
f1 corresponds to the L-response (see Eq. 34). In addition, when at least one player makes the
B-response, both players’ strategies in the equilibrium are given as fixed functions, as already
mentioned. In the present case with ǫ1, ǫ2 > 0, however, it is necessary to consider the functional
dynamics, where both players change their strategy functions by learning the other’s strategy
function. Therefore, we add the time variable t.
Eq. 49 represents the functional dynamics [29–31], where the change in time depends on the
function rather than the dynamic systems of state variables of a finite dimension (for example, in
dynamical-systems game [32]). Hence, we need to solve the dynamics of infinite dimensions.
We now analyze the equilibrium state of Eq. 49. In the following, we assume that there exist a
pair of fixed-point functions as an equilibrium state of the functional dynamics, which is denoted
by f∗1 (x2), f
∗
2 (x1) satisfying
f∗1 (x2) = argmaxx1u1(x1, ǫ1f
∗
2 (x1) + (1− ǫ1)x2),
f∗2 (x1) = argmaxx2u2(ǫ2f
∗
1 (x2) + (1− ǫ2)x1, x2).
(15)
As demonstrated later numerically, fixed-point functions are reached in various games. To study
the behavior near the equilibrium, we derive a crossing point of the equilibrium functions and its
neighborhood. By assuming the continuity of the functions around the crossing point, we expand
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the equilibrium functions as
f∗1 (x2) = x
eq∗
1 + a
∗
1(x2 − xeq∗2 ),
f∗2 (x1) = x
eq∗
2 + a
∗
2(x1 − xeq∗1 ).
(16)
By substituting Eq. 16 into Eq. 15, we get the first-order term as
∂
∂x1
(
u1(x1, x2)|x2=xˆ2
)∣∣∣∣
eq∗
= 0,
∂
∂x2
(
u2(x1, x2)|x1=xˆ1
)∣∣∣∣
eq∗
= 0.
(17)
Then, we also get the second-order term as
∂
∂x2
(
∂
∂x1
(
u1(x1, x2)|x2=xˆ2
)∣∣∣∣
x1=f∗1 (x2)
)∣∣∣∣∣
eq∗
= 0,
∂
∂x1
(
∂
∂x2
(
u2(x1, x2)|x1=xˆ1
)∣∣∣∣
x2=f∗2 (x1)
)∣∣∣∣∣
eq∗
= 0,
(18)
where xˆ1 =: ǫ2f
∗
1 (x2) + (1− ǫ2)x1 and xˆ2 := ǫ1f∗2 (x1) + (1− ǫ1)x2. Here, Eq. 17 indicates that the
crossing point (xeq∗1 , x
eq∗
2 ) satisfies the optimization condition for the other’s function, while Eq. 18
is a consequence of the fixed-point functions, indicating that the set of equilibrium functions
(f∗1 (x2), f
∗
2 (x1)) satisfies the optimization condition in the neighborhood of the crossing point. To
compute the player’s equilibrium payoff given by (xeq∗1 , x
eq∗
2 ), the above calculation of f
∗
1 and f
∗
2 is
thus sufficient.
As an extreme case, we consider ǫi = 1, in which both players perfectly recognize the other’s
intention. The fixed point in this case is the LL equilibrium. Here, both players make L-responses,
which are constant for the other’s action. Therefore, from Eq. 34, the achieved actions at the LL
equilibrium correspond to those at BB (i.e., the Nash equilibrium), namely xLLi = x
BB
i (see the
upper right of Fig. 3). Note that the equilibrium points are identical, whereas they are different
in the functional dynamics. Indeed, from Eqs. 17 and 18, we can confirm that xeq∗i is equal for LL
and BB, while a∗i is not (see the Supplementary Data for the detailed calculation). Owing to this
inequality in a∗i , the function equilibrium holds in LL, but not in BB: In the functional dynamics
with ǫi = 0, both players’ strategy functions are constant in LL, while for ǫi = 1, they are not.
It may be disappointing that the classical Nash equilibrium is achieved as the LL equilibrium in
the game between the learning players. As explained later, however, this LL equilibrium is rarely
achieved; indeed, in many cases, novel equilibria are achieved according to the functional dynamics.
Below, we discuss some specific examples for the functional dynamics.
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FIG. 3. Equilibrium state of mutual learning in a resource competition game. For all nine figures, the
X-axis (Y-axis) indicates player 1’s (2’s) action, denoted by x1 (x2). The blue (green) line indicates 1’s (2’s)
strategy function and the solid (broken) line indicates the simulated (analytical) solution. The yellow circle
is the crossing point and the red circles are the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria to allow for a comparison
of positions. The left, center, and right figures are respectively the cases of ǫ1 = 0, 0.5, 1, while the upper,
center, and lower figures are respectively the cases of ǫ2 = 0, 0.5, 1.
A. Example 1: resource competition game
We again consider the resource competition game. From Eqs. 17 and 18, we get the set of
equilibrium actions (xeq∗1 , x
eq∗
2 ) and the set of equilibrium gradients around them (a
∗
1, a
∗
2) as given
14
by
xeq∗1 =
1
r + ǫ1a∗2
{√
r(xeq∗2 − ǫ1a∗2xeq∗1 )− (xeq∗2 − ǫ1a∗2xeq∗1 )
}
,
xeq∗2 =
1
1 + rǫ2a∗1
{√
r(xeq∗1 − ǫ2a∗1xeq∗2 )− r(xeq∗1 − ǫ2a∗1xeq∗2 )
}
,
a∗1 =
1
r + ǫ1a∗2

 r(1− ǫ1)2√r(xeq∗2 − ǫ1a∗2xeq∗1 ) − (1− ǫ1)

 ,
a∗2 =
1
1 + rǫ2a∗1

 r(1− ǫ2)2√r(xeq∗1 − ǫ2a∗1xeq∗2 ) − r(1− ǫ2)

 .
(19)
We now simulate Eq. 49 and compare the simulation results with the calculation, confirming that
both players’ strategy functions immediately converge to fixed ones (see Fig. 4). The crossing points
(xeq∗1 , x
eq∗
2 ) of these functions agree well with the above analytic estimation and the converged
strategy functions in the neighborhood of the crossing points are well estimated by Eq. 16 with the
above values a∗1 and a
∗
2. In addition, the action compared with the other’s action is calculated from
fixed-point function f , as shown in Fig. 3. This indicates that the more (less) each player learns
the other’s strategy, the less (more) dependent the strategy function is on the other’s action.
FIG. 4. An example of the functional dynamics in a resource competition game for r = 1.5, (ǫ1, ǫ2) =
(0.5, 0.5). For all figures, the X-axis (Y-axis) indicates player 1’s (2’s) action, denoted by x1 (x2). The solid
blue (green) line indicates 1’s (2’s) strategy function until t = 6. The broken lines indicate both players’
ones in the equilibrium, achieved at t = 20.
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B. Example 2: duopoly game
As in the resource competition game, both players’ strategy functions converge to fixed functions
for any ǫ1 and ǫ2. Here, recall that the learning side exploits the learned side regardless of whether
the former is superior or not. This result can be applied to the case with continuous learning
degrees ǫ1 and ǫ2. The larger ǫ1, the larger (smaller) 1’s (2’s) payoff is, with larger exploitation
(see the Supplementary Data for the details).
V. DYNAMICS OF THE DEGREE OF LEARNING
Thus far, the learning degree ǫi has been given and fixed. Thus, for each player, the case with
ǫi = 1 would be the better one for receiving a higher payoff. Each player, however, can change the
degree to which he/she learns the other’s strategy. Initially, each player may not care about the
other, and he/she learns the other’s strategy more through the repeated game. In the following, we
consider this temporal evolution in the degree of learning, ǫ1, ǫ2. Here, assuming that the other’s
strategy function is fixed, each player tries to increase his/her payoff by changing his/her learning
degree. Therefore, the dynamics of both players’ learning degrees are given by
ǫ˙1 = S1
∂ u1(x1, ǫ1f2(x1) + (1− ǫ1)x2)|eq∗
∂ǫ1
,
ǫ˙2 = S2
∂ u2(ǫ2f1(x2) + (1− ǫ2)x1, x2)|eq∗
∂ǫ2
,
(20)
where S1, S2 is the speed with which each player optimizes the intensity of recognition. In the
following, we simulate these dynamics for the introduced example and examine what equilibrium
is reached.
A. Example 1: resource competition game
Fig. 5 shows the dynamics of ǫ1 and ǫ2 for various sets of learning speeds (S1, S2), while this
temporal evolution in the payoff of each player according to Eq. 50 is shown in Fig. 6.
First, the initial BB (Nash) equilibrium is unstable compared with the learning dynamics. In
other words, both players are motivated to learn the other’s strategy and to change their strategies
accordingly because the payoff has a nonzero gradient at (x1, x2) around the BB equilibrium point.
Second, as one player’s learning is superior, the other’s learning is repressed. During the evolu-
tion of learning, one player learns the other’s gradient of the strategy function, and his/her strategy
16
FIG. 5. Trajectories of a set of learning degrees (ǫ1, ǫ2) for different ratios of learning speeds S1/S2 in a
resource competition game. The blue, green, red, cyan, and magenta lines represent the cases of S1/S2 =
0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 4, respectively. For all trajectories, the dynamics of Eq. 50 start from (ǫ1, ǫ2) = (0, 0).
approaches a constant function (L-response). Each player tries to gain more benefit by repressing
the other’s cost. Therefore, the superior player 1 increases his/her cost as a result of his/her own
learning, while the inferior player 2 decreases his/her cost.
Third, the intermediate state between the LB/BL and LL equilibria is finally achieved depending
on the evolutionary speed relationship. Not only the edges (LB, BL, and LL equilibria), but also
the intermediate states of LB (BL) and LL (ǫ1, ǫ2 is between 0 and 1) are achieved, where every
player succeeds in optimizing his/her strategy function for the other’s one. In other words, the
function equilibrium is achieved as a result of these dynamics.
B. Example 2: duopoly game
In this case, the players also finally reach the intermediate state between the LB/BL and LL
equilibria as a result of mutual learning, where the function equilibrium is satisfied. In addition,
the more 1’s (2’s) learning speed increases, the more 1 (2) exploits the benefit from the other in
the final state (see the Supplementary Data for more details.)
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FIG. 6. Player 1’s payoff (blue dots) and player 2’s payoff (green dots) in the equilibrium state of Eq. 50 for
the diverse sets of learning speeds (S1, S2) in a resource competition game. The red (yellow) broken lines
indicate player 1’s (2’s) payoff. The right, middle, and left broken lines indicate the payoffs at the LB, LL,
and BL equilibria, respectively.
VI. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this study, we introduce a new formulation for the mutual recognition of intention, which is
represented as functional dynamics. In the formulation, every player can read the other’s strategy
function f(x), which determines the action to be chosen for the other’s action x.
As a result, we proved that both players can increase their payoffs according to their learning.
The more a player learns the other’s strategy, the less his/her action depends on the other’s action
(i.e., the function approaches a constant function). Since such a constant function does not provide
any motivation to learn, the process of mutual learning stops when one player perfectly learns the
other’s strategy function.
The resultant function equilibrium includes and extends two kinds of well-known equilibria
(Nash and Stackelberg), which are achieved in contrasting situations. In the extreme case in which
one player one-sidedly learns the other, the Stackelberg equilibrium is achieved. On the contrary,
when the evolutionary speeds of the learning of both players are of comparative order, the Nash
equilibrium is achieved again. In contrast to previous studies, our study discusses such equilibria as
the crossing points of the strategy functions. Furthermore, depending on the evolutionary speeds
of learning, the intermediate equilibria between the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are achieved.
18
This finding may lead to understanding how the leader–follower relationship is formed in game
theory according to intention recognition.
Furthermore, we also confirm that each player’s payoff changes according to intention recogni-
tion in the resource competition game. The faster the superior player learns the other’s strategy
function, the more that player exploits the other, where the learning (learned) player’s payoff in-
creases (decreases). On the contrary, the faster the inferior person learns, the more the players
cooperate, meaning that both players’ payoffs increase. In the learning process, one player’s pos-
itive (negative) gradient of his/her strategy function leads to a decrease (increase) in the other’s
competitiveness.
In this study, we only consider the two-player case. In the case of n(≥ 3) players, each player’s
strategy function is (n−1)-dimensional, and the function equilibrium is more complicated. Further-
more, some equilibria regarded as neither Nash nor Stackelberg equilibria emerge. For example,
we can consider the cases of one-sided learning from 1 to 2, from 2 to 3, and from 3 to 1. Such
a learning loop does not appear as an equilibrium in the extensive form game [21]. This will be
discussed in future work.
In our formulation, we assume that each player’s learning speed is independent of its accuracy.
This assumption results in a monotonic advantage for the increase in learning speed, at least in
the duopoly game. In reality, however, there is a trade-off between the accuracy of reading and
speed of evolution, which provides another disadvantage for the fast evolution owing to incomplete
information. Indeed, some previous studies show that such incomplete information on the other’s
action leads to disutility [33].
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Supplementary Material
VIII. GENERAL GAMES
A. Condition for disagreement between the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria
Here, we consider a condition under which a player increases his/her payoff owing to the one-
sided recognition of the other’s response. In the following, we assume a game satisfying the following
two points: (1) the space of each player’s possible action is bounded and (2) each player’s payoff
ui(x1, x2) is a twice differentiable function. Then, we consider two situations for agreement between
the LB and BB equilibria: both of them exist (i) in the inside of the space of all players’ actions
or (ii) on the border. In the following, we discuss whether LB and BB coincide for each of these
situations.
First, when the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria exist within the space of all players’ actions
(examples 1 and 2 satisfy this condition in reality), a set of actions at the Nash equilibrium
(xBB1 , x
BB
2 ) satisfies
∂u1
∂x1
∣∣∣∣
BB
= 0, (21)
∂u2
∂x2
∣∣∣∣
BB
= 0. (22)
Next, we consider a condition satisfied by the Stackelberg (LB) equilibrium. When player 1’s
equilibrium action xLB1 is optimal given the recognition of the other’s intention f
B
2 , we get
∂u1(x1, f
B
2 (x1))
∂x1
∣∣∣∣
LB
= 0,
⇔ ∂u1
∂x1
∣∣∣∣
LB
+
∂fB2
∂x1
∣∣∣∣
LB
∂u1
∂x2
∣∣∣∣
LB
= 0.
(23)
Here, ∂fB2 /∂x1 is given by
∂u2
∂x2
∣∣∣∣
x2=fB2 (x1)
= 0,
⇔ ∂
2u2
∂x1∂x2
+
∂fB2
∂x1
∂2u2
∂x22
= 0.
(24)
By substituting Eq. 24 into Eq. 23, we obtain a condition for the LB equilibrium as
∂u1
∂x1
∣∣∣∣
LB
∂2u2
∂x22
∣∣∣∣
LB
+
∂u1
∂x2
∣∣∣∣
LB
∂2u2
∂x1∂x2
∣∣∣∣
LB
= 0. (25)
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In addition, since player 2 makes a B-response, another condition for the LB equilibrium is given
by
∂u2
∂x2
∣∣∣∣
LB
= 0. (26)
Let us now compare the above condition (Eqs. 25 and 26) for the LB equilibrium with that of the
BB equilibrium (Eqs. 21, 22). First, the second condition is common between the two. Next, the
first condition is different as long as the second term in Eq. 25 is nonzero. Hence, the condition
for the mismatch between LB and BB is given by
∂u1
∂x2
∣∣∣∣
BB
6= 0,
∂2u2
∂x1∂x2
∣∣∣∣
BB
6= 0.
(27)
The condition for disagreement between BL and BB is given in the same way. In examples 1 and
2, we discuss this condition concretely.
Second, we also consider a case in which the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria exist on the
border of the space of all players’ actions. In particular, we consider a situation that the LB and
BB equilibria are on the border of player 2’s action, in other words, xLB2 = x
BB
2 = infx2 or supx2
holds. In this case, the recognizer’s payoff satisfies
uLB1 = maxx1u1(x1, f
B
2 (x1))
≤ maxx1u1(x1, xBB2 )
= uBB1 .
(28)
Here, from the assumption that the LB equilibrium exists on the border of player 2’s action, we can
derive the second line from the first one (see Fig. S1). In addition, as shown in the main manuscript,
player 1 obtains no advantage by recognizing the other’s B-response; in other words, uLB1 ≥ uBB1
holds. Thus, we get uLB1 = u
BB
1 and then prove x
LB
1 = x
BB
1 . Putting this in other terms, x
LB
1 6= xBB1
and xLB2 = x
BB
2 = infx2, supx2 are incompatible. In example 3, we see a concrete illustration of
the overlap between the LB and BB equilibria.
B. Solution of the functional dynamics
Here, we derive the following functional dynamics:
f∗1 (x2) = argmaxx1u1(x1, ǫ1f
∗
2 (x1) + (1− ǫ1)x2)
f∗2 (x1) = argmaxx2u2(ǫ2f
∗
1 (x2) + (1− ǫ2)x1, x2)
(29)
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FIG. S 1. Player 2’s response functions when LB and BB exist on x2 = x
min
2
. The blue (green) line indicates
player 2’s response in LB x2 = f
B
2
(x1) (BB x2 = x
BB
2
). From the above assumption, the LB equilibrium can
only exist on the blue solid line. Thus, the existence region of the LB equilibrium (the first line in Eq. 28)
is included by that of the BB equilibrium (the second line in Eq. 28).
First, we expand the equilibrium functions around the crossing points as
f∗1 (x2) = a
∗
1(x2 − xeq∗2 ) + xeq∗1 ,
f∗2 (x1) = a
∗
2(x1 − xeq∗1 ) + xeq∗2 .
(30)
In the following, we calculate the solution of player 1’s function f∗1 (x2), which is given by
∂
∂x1
(u1(x1, ǫ1f
∗
2 (x1) + (1− ǫ1)x2))
∣∣∣∣
x1=f∗1 (x2)
= 0 (31)
in x2 ≃ xeq∗2 . Thus, we obtain the first-order term as
∂
∂x1
(u1(x1, ǫ1f
∗
2 (x1) + (1− ǫ1)x2))
∣∣∣∣
x1=f∗1 (x2)
∣∣∣∣∣
x2=x
eq∗
2
= 0
⇔ ∂
∂x1
(u1(x1, ǫ1f
∗
2 (x1) + (1− ǫ1)x2))
∣∣∣∣
eq∗
⇔ ∂u1
∂x1
∣∣∣∣
eq∗
+ ǫ1a
∗
2
∂u1
∂x2
∣∣∣∣
eq∗
= 0.
(32)
Here, |eq∗ is an operation of (x1, x2) = (xeq∗1 , xeq∗2 ). Then, we also obtain the second-order term as
∂
∂x2
(
∂
∂x1
(u1(x1, ǫ1f
∗
2 (x1) + (1− ǫ1)x2))
∣∣∣∣
x1=f∗1 (x2)
)∣∣∣∣∣
x2=x
eq∗
2
= 0
⇔ a∗1
(
∂2u1
∂x21
∣∣∣∣
eq∗
+ 2ǫ1a
∗
2
∂2u1
∂x1∂x2
∣∣∣∣
eq∗
+ (ǫ1a
∗
2)
2 ∂
2u1
∂x22
∣∣∣∣
eq∗
)
+ (1− ǫ1)
(
∂2u1
∂x1∂x2
∣∣∣∣
eq∗
+ ǫ1a
∗
2
∂2u1
∂x22
∣∣∣∣
eq∗
)
= 0.
(33)
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IX. EXAMPLE 1: RESOURCE COMPETITION GAME
In this game, both players’ payoffs are defined by
u1(x1, x2) :=
rx1
rx1 + x2
− x1,
u2(x1, x2) :=
x2
rx1 + x2
− x2.
(34)
A. BB equilibrium
Each player’s B-response is calculated as follows:
fB1 (x2) := argmaxx1≥0u1(x1, x2)
= max(
√
x2/r − (x2/r), 0)
,
fB2 (x1) := argmaxx2≥0u2(x1, x2)
= max(
√
x1r − (x1r), 0)
.
(35)
Then, the crossing actions at the BB equilibrium are given as

 x
BB
1 = max(
√
xBB2 /r − (xBB2 /r), 0)
xBB2 = max(
√
xBB1 r − (xBB1 r), 0)
⇔ xBB1 = xBB2 = r/(1 + r)2.
(36)
From Eq. 36, each player’s payoff is obtained as
uBB1 := u1(x
BB
1 , x
BB
2 ) = r
2/(1 + r)2,
uBB2 := u2(x
BB
1 , x
BB
2 ) = 1/(1 + r)
2.
(37)
B. LB equilibrium
Player 1’s L-response is given by
fL1 (x2) := argmaxx1u1(x1, f2(x1))
= argmaxx1u1(x1, f
B
2 (x1))
=

 r/4 (1 ≤ r < 2)1/r (2 ≤ r)
(38)
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Then, we get the actions and payoffs at the crossing point as
(xLB1 , x
LB
2 , u
LB
1 , u
LB
2 ) =


(
r
4
,
r
2
(
1− r
2
)
,
r
4
,
(
1− r
2
)2)
(1 ≤ r < 2)(
1
r
, 0, 1 − 1
r
, 0
)
(2 ≤ r)
(39)
By comparing LB with BB, we can prove xLB1 > x
BB
1 , x
LB
2 < x
BB
2 , u
LB
1 > u
BB
1 , and u
LB
2 < u
BB
2
for all r > 1.
C. BL equilibrium
Player 2’s L-response is given by
fL2 (x1) := argmaxx2u2(f1(x2), x2)
= argmaxx2u2(f
B
1 (x2), x2)
= 1/(4r).
(40)
Then, we get the actions and payoffs at the crossing point as
(xLB1 , x
LB
2 , u
LB
1 , u
LB
2 ) =
(
1
2r
(
1− 1
2r
)
,
1
4r
,
(
1− 1
2r
)2
,
1
4r
)
. (41)
By comparing BL with BB, we can prove xBL1 < x
BB
1 , x
BL
2 < x
BB
2 , u
BL
1 > u
BB
1 , and u
BL
2 > u
BB
2
for all r > 1.
D. Difference between the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria
Here, Eq. 27 can predict whether the Stackelberg and Nash equilibria are equal. From the
comparison between LB and BB, we calculate Eq. 27 as
∂u1
∂x2
∣∣∣∣
BB
= −1 6= 0,
∂2u2
∂x1∂x2
∣∣∣∣
BB
= (r + 1)(−r + 1) =

 = 0 (r = 1)6= 0 (r > 1)
(42)
This equation shows that LB coincides with BB in the case of r = 1 and not in the case of r > 1.
We discuss the overlap between BL and BB in the same way.
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E. Analytical solution of the functional dynamics
Here, we derive the analytical solution of the functional dynamics. From Eq. 32, the first-order
term xeq∗1 of player 1’s function f
∗
1 (x2) is given by
∂u1
∂x1
∣∣∣∣
eq∗
+ ǫ1a
∗
2
∂u1
∂x2
∣∣∣∣
eq∗
= 0
⇔ xeq∗1 =
1
r + ǫ1a
∗
2
{√
r(xeq∗2 − ǫ1a∗2xeq∗1 )− (xeq∗2 − ǫ1a∗2xeq∗1 )
} (43)
by substituting
∂u1
∂x1
∣∣∣∣
eq∗
=
rxeq∗2
rxeq∗1 + x
eq∗
2
− 1,
∂u1
∂x2
∣∣∣∣
eq∗
= − rx
eq∗
1
rxeq∗1 + x
eq∗
2
.
(44)
Then, from Eq. 33, the second-order term a∗1 of player 1’s function is given by
a∗1
(
∂2u1
∂x21
∣∣∣∣
eq∗
+ 2ǫ1a
∗
2
∂2u1
∂x1∂x2
∣∣∣∣
eq∗
+ (ǫ1a
∗
2)
2 ∂
2u1
∂x22
∣∣∣∣
eq∗
)
+ (1− ǫ1)
(
∂2u1
∂x1∂x2
∣∣∣∣
eq∗
+ ǫ1a
∗
2
∂2u1
∂x22
∣∣∣∣
eq∗
)
= 0.
⇔ a∗1 =
1− ǫ1
r + ǫ1a∗2
{
rxeq∗1 + x
eq∗
2
2(xeq∗2 − ǫ1a∗2xeq∗1 )
− 1
}
(45)
by substituting
∂2u1
∂x21
∣∣∣∣
eq∗
= − 2rx
eq∗
1
(rxeq∗1 + x
eq∗
2 )
3
,
∂2u1
∂x1∂x2
∣∣∣∣
eq∗
=
r(rxeq∗1 − xeq∗2 )
(rxeq∗1 + x
eq∗
2 )
3
,
∂2u1
∂x22
∣∣∣∣
eq∗
=
2rxeq∗1
(rxeq∗1 + x
eq∗
2 )
3
.
(46)
F. Difference between BB and LL in the functional dynamics
From the above solution of the functional dynamics, we derive the BB and LL equilibria. First,
by substituting ǫ1 = ǫ2 = 0 (BB equilibrium), we get
(xBB1 , x
BB
2 , a
BB
1 , a
BB
2 ) =
(
r
(1 + r)2
,
r
(1 + r)2
,
r − 1
2r
,−r − 1
2
)
. (47)
Then, by substituting ǫ1 = ǫ2 = 1 (LL equilibrium), we get
(xLL1 , x
LL
2 , a
LL
1 , a
LL
2 ) =
(
r
(1 + r)2
,
r
(1 + r)2
, 0, 0
)
. (48)
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From these equations, we confirm xBBi = x
LL
i , but a
BB
i 6= aLLi . This finding indicates that although
the same equilibrium actions are achieved in BB and LL, the (gradient of the) response function
between them differs.
X. EXAMPLE 2: DUOPOLY GAME
In this game, both players’ payoffs are defined by
u1(x1, x2) := x1max(p − x1 − x2 − c1, 0),
u2(x1, x2) := x2max(p − x2 − x1 − c2, 0).
(49)
A. BB equilibrium
Both players’ B-responses are given by
xB1 (x2) = max(1− x2 − c1, 0)/2,
xB2 (x1) = max(1− x1 − c2, 0)/2.
(50)
Then, both players’ actions and payoffs at the BB equilibrium are given by
(xBB1 , x
BB
2 , u
BB
1 , u
BB
2 ) =
(
1− 2c1 + c2
3
,
1− 2c2 + c1
3
,
(1− 2c2 + c1)2
9
,
(1− 2c1 + c2)2
9
)
. (51)
B. LB equilibrium
Player 1’s L-response is given by
fL1 (x2) = argmaxx1u1(x1, f
B
2 (x1))
=

 (1− 2c1 + c2)/2 (1 > 3c2 − 2c1)1− c2 (1 ≤ 3c2 − 2c1)
(52)
Then, we get the actions and payoffs at the crossing point as
(xLB1 , x
LB
2 , u
LB
1 , u
LB
2 )
=


(
1− 2c1 + c2
2
,
1− 3c2 + 2c1
4
,
(1− 2c1 + c2)2
8
,
(1− 3c2 + 2c1)2
16
)
(1 > 3c2 − 2c1)
(1− c2, 0, (1 − c2)(c2 − c1), 0) (2 ≤ r)
(53)
By comparing Eq. 53 with 51, we get xLB1 > x
BB
1 , x
LB
2 < x
BB
2 , u
LB
1 > u
BB
1 , and u
LB
2 < u
BB
2 .
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C. BL equilibrium
Player 2’s L-response is given by
fL2 (x1) = argmaxx2u2(f
B
1 (x2), x2)
= (1− 2c2 + c1)/2.
(54)
Then, we get the actions and payoffs at the crossing point as
(xBL1 , x
BL
2 , u
BL
1 , u
BL
2 ) =
(
1− 3c1 + 2c2
4
,
1− 2c2 + c1
2
,
(1− 3c1 + 2c2)2
16
,
(1− 2c2 + c1)2
8
)
. (55)
By comparing Eq. 55 with Eq. 51, we get xBL1 < x
BB
1 , x
BL
2 > x
BB
2 , u
BL
1 < u
BB
1 , and u
BL
2 > u
BB
2 .
D. Difference between the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria
We now discuss whether the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are equal. From Eq. 27, we get
∂u1
∂x2
∣∣∣∣
BB
=
(1− 2c1 + c2)2
3
6= 0,
∂2u2
∂x1∂x2
∣∣∣∣
BB
= −1 6= 0.
(56)
Hence, the LB and BB equilibria are not equal.
E. Analytical solution of the functional dynamics
In the duopoly game, player 1”’s payoff u1(x1, x2) depends on x1 (x2) at most quadratically
(linearly), and u2(x1, x2) depends on x2 (x1) at most quadratically (linearly), respectively. Thus,
we get
f∗1 (x2) = max(a
∗
1x2 + b
∗
1, 0),
f∗2 (x1) = max(a
∗
2x1 + b
∗
2, 0).
(57)
From Eqs. 32 and 33, we obtain both players’ functions as
a∗1 =
(2− ǫ1 + ǫ2)−
√
(2− ǫ1 − ǫ2)2 + 4ǫ1ǫ2
4ǫ2
,
a∗2 =
(2− ǫ2 + ǫ1)−
√
(2− ǫ1 − ǫ2)2 + 4ǫ1ǫ2
4ǫ1
,
b∗1 =
2(1− ǫ2a∗1)(1 − c1)− ǫ1(1− c2)
4(1 − ǫ1a∗2)(1− ǫ2a∗1)− ǫ1ǫ2
,
b∗2 =
2(1− ǫ2a∗2)(1 − c2)− ǫ2(1− c1)
4(1 − ǫ1a∗2)(1− ǫ2a∗1)− ǫ1ǫ2
.
(58)
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Fig. S2 shows that the equilibrium functions f∗1 (x2), f
∗
2 (x1) obtained from the simulation agree
well with the above analytic expectation. Fig. S3 shows the equilibrium payoffs achieved by both
players’ functions f∗1 (x2), f
∗
2 (x1) for (ǫ1, ǫ2) with ǫ1, ǫ2 = 0, 0.5, 1.
FIG. S 2. Equilibrium functions of mutual intention recognition in duopoly game (c1, c2) = (0, 0.2), p = 1.
For all nine figures, the X-axis (Y-axis) indicates player 1’s (2’s) action, denoted by x1 (x2). The blue
(green) line indicates 1’s (2’s) intention and the solid (broken) line indicates the simulated (analytical)
solution. These agree with each other. The yellow dot is the crossing point, while the red dots are the Nash
and Stackelberg equilibria plotted for reference. The left, center, and right figures are respectively the cases
of ǫ1 = 0, 0.5, 1, while the upper, center, and lower figures are respectively the cases of ǫ2 = 0, 0.5, 1.
F. Simulation of the learning process
Here, we consider a process to change the degree of recognition ǫi to increase the first agent’s
payoff under the other’s intention. Fig. S4 shows how both players’ recognition degrees change for
some S1/S2. In addition, the finally achieved payoffs are plotted in Fig. S5.
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FIG. S 3. Player 1’s (left) and 2’s (right) simulated payoffs in the equilibrium of intention recognition in
duopoly game (c1, c2) = (0, 0.1). For all figures, the X-axis (Y-axis) indicates player 1’s (2’s) recognition
degree.
FIG. S 4. Trajectories of the set of recognition degrees (ǫ1, ǫ2) for diverse sets of learning speed (S1, S2) in
duopoly game (c1, c2) = (0, 0.1), p = 1. The blue, green, red, cyan, and magenta lines represent the cases of
S1/S2 = 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 4, respectively. For all trajectories, the learning dynamics start from (ǫ1, ǫ2) = (0, 0).
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FIG. S 5. Player 1’s payoff (blue dots) and player 2’s payoff (green dots) in the equilibrium state as a
function of S1/S2, i.e., for the ratio of learning speeds (S1, S2) in duopoly game (c1, c2) = (0, 0.1), p = 1.
The red (yellow) broken lines indicate player 1’s (2’s) payoff at the LB (right), LL (middle), and BL (left)
equilibria for reference, respectively.
XI. EXAMPLE 3: PROBABILISTIC PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAME
Our third example is a prisoner’s dilemma game in which each of the players chooses whether
to cooperate or defect. In general, each player’s payoff is given by
u1(x1, x2) = T (1− x1)x2 +Rx1x2 + P (1− x1)(1− x2) + Sx1(1− x2),
u2(x1, x2) = T (1− x2)x1 +Rx2x1 + P (1− x2)(1− x1) + Sx2(1− x1).
(59)
Here, both T > R > P > S and 2R > T +S are required. Then, we consider a situation that each
player determines the probability x1, x2 to cooperate as his/her action.
First, each player’s B-response is given by
fB1 (x2) = 0,
fB2 (x1) = 0.
(60)
Eq. 60 indicates that every player is better off choosing defection regardless of the opponent’s
cooperativeness. In other words, both B-responses are constant compared with the change in the
opponent’s action. Then, we get the following actions and payoffs at the BB equilibrium:
(xBB1 , x
BB
2 , u
BB
1 , u
BB
2 ) = (0, 0, P, P ). (61)
Player 1’s L-response is given by
fL1 (x2) = argmaxx1u1(x1, f
B
2 (x1))
= 0.
(62)
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This equation indicates that player 1’s L-response is equal to the B-response. Hence, player 1 gains
no advantage by one-way recognition. This is also true for player 2’s one-way recognition. Hence,
the LB, BL, and BB equilibria are all given by xeq1 = x
eq
2 = 0, and all of them agree.
